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1

Introduction

Contract theory studies the provision of incentives to economic agents who
need to be persuaded to act against their own immediate interests. As such,
contracts need to be enforced. However, despite the emphasis on incentive
problems very little attention has been paid to the incentives of the contract
enforcer, a role that in modern economies is most often played by a judge.
Instead, there has been virtual unanimity among contract theorists that judges
will enforce contracts exactly as intended.1 This paper relaxes the assumption
that judges behave perfectly, and presents a variant of the standard principalagent model in which a judge can (at some cost) accept bribes not to enforce
a contract.
The basic argument of the paper is that foreseeing that they will be exploited ex post, contracting parties will respond to judicial agency by limiting
the power they give to the judge ex ante. In other words, they cease to contract
and/or omit contingencies from the contract in order to prevent a judge from
extracting a bribe ex post by manipulating how the contingency is enforced.
This effect will be more pronounced when the incentives that need to be provided to the agent are high and when corruption is more of a problem within
the judiciary. Moreover, since corruption is more likely to go undetected in situations calling for substantial judicial interpretation, it follows that contracts
contingent on circumstances hard to unambiguously specify will be harder to
write.
Most legal histories suggest that judicial agency was an important phenomenon historically, while both anecdotal and survey evidence suggest that
it is still widespread in developing countries today. Below, I review some of
this evidence, along with some contemporary instances of judicial agency in
the U.S. Moreover, although for the most part I will speak of judges as accepting bribes, the formal model is closely related to one in which contracting
parties hire lawyers to represent them, and the more resources they spend on
legal representation the more likely it is they win a case independent of its
merits (see subsection 3.6 below).
After studying the implications of judicial agency on contracting, the paper
turns to a couple of ways in which its effects can be ameliorated.
First, opinion is divided on whether or not to punish an individual who
1

The incomplete contracting literature (see, e.g., Hart 1995) does of course explicitly
allow for the possibility that not all contracts and contract clauses are possible. One reason
often given for this restriction is that the underlying economic state is not observable by the
judge. However, the possibility that a judge may observe the state but may lack the correct
incentives to properly enforce the contract is not discussed.

1
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illicitly pays a judge only in response to a threat of an unfair decision (i.e., extortion). The argument against such punishments is that they make it harder
for the party in the right to prevail in court. Conversely, the argument in
favor is that punishing extortion reduces its incidence. The analysis shows
that under many conditions the first effect dominates, and extortion should
not be punished. The key reason is that in litigation between two parties, extortion by the judge is only credible if the party in the wrong tries to bribe the
judge, but in this case punishing the party in the right for making competing
payments makes matters worse. Thus there is an incentive-based reason to
refrain from punishing individuals who pay judges when threatened with bad
outcomes, even without considering issues of “fairness.”
Second, arguably the most important check placed on judicial discretion is
oversight by other judges, and in particular, the possibility of appeal. I use the
model to analyze possible appeal arrangements, and show that only the party
being incentivized by the contract should enjoy the right of appeal. (This
corresponds to widespread protection against “double-jeopardy” for criminal
defendants.)
The basic model of the paper is as follows. A principal seeks to contract
with an agent, who can take either a good or bad action. The agent prefers
the bad action, while the good action generates a greater total surplus. In
order to persuade the agent to take the good action, the principal and agent
can write a contract in which the agent is punished if she takes the bad action,
and/or rewarded if she does not. Given the contract, the principal and agent
can make illicit payments to the judge in order to affect the court decision. It
is costly (in terms of risk of punishment, reputation, and moral repugnance)
for the judge to accept these payments, and also costly for him to change his
decision in response, and judges differ in the magnitude of these costs.
Potential bribes are larger when the agent needs to be given stronger incentives. But the availability of larger bribes increases the number of judges
who prefer to take bribes rather than behave honestly. Increased corruption in
turn decreases the incentives actually provided by any given contract, so the
original contract must be amended to provide additional incentives to compensate for the possibility that some judges will behave corruptly. But of
course, these additional incentives lead to yet higher potential bribes, which
in turn necessitate yet higher incentives.
Consequently, contracts that supply large incentives expose the parties involved to high corruption costs. Moreover, there is an upper limit to the
incentives that a contract can supply — attempting to supply further incentives simply increases the expected bribes paid. In general, the model predicts
that individuals are more likely to contract ex ante when the value of doing
2
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so is high, when the incentives that the contract must supply are low, and
when judges face high costs of behaving corruptly. Conversely, there exists
a wide range of circumstances in which parties do not contract even when it
would be beneficial do so in the absence of judicial agency. One interpretation
of this predicted absence of apparently desirable contracts is as an instance of
contractual incompleteness.
While some existing work deals with the corruption of law enforcers (see,
e.g., Becker and Stigler 1974, or more recently Polinsky and Shavell 2001), the
focus of this work has generally been on issues such as how corruption affects
the deterrence effect of existing laws, and how one should optimally monitor
and compensate law enforcers. Although related, the focus of this paper is
on the distinct question of what contracts are worthwhile when the contract
enforcer is corrupt. Closer in spirit to this paper are Friedman (1999), Mui
(1999), Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite (2007, 2009), and Glaeser and Shleifer
(2002). Friedman identifies the possibility of extortion by enforcing authorities as a reason to limit the size of the punishment. Mui analyzes the standard
hold-up problem of the incomplete contract literature in a setting where ex
post renegotiation is in part determined by the possibility of litigating in a corrupt court. Anderlini, Felli and Postlewaite consider a court that voids some
contracts so as to maximize individuals’ ex ante utility, and explore the consequences for relation-specific investments and for insurance against unforeseen
contingencies. Glaeser and Shleifer seek to explain the evolution of English
Common Law and French Civil Law in terms of the relative power of citizens,
self-interested judges and the head of state. Finally, a contemporaneous paper by Immordino and Pagano (forthcoming) studies optimal regulation in the
presence of a corrupt enforcer.2
On a analytical level this paper is also related to those of Spier (1994),
Bernardo et al (2000), and Legros and Newman (2002), all three of which study
the interaction between an underlying agency problem and the expenditures
parties can make to influence the contract outcome. The current paper differs
from the first two of these in that higher-powered contracts lead not only to
greater litigation expenditures, but that these expenditures in turn reduce the
incentives provided by a contract and necessitate a still higher-powered contract. It is this feedback effect that accounts for why high-powered contracts
are particularly expensive to write. Legros and Newman allow for feedback
to contract terms, but consider a simple model in which parties either spend
2

In Immordino and Pagano, the penalty is independent of the regulation, and hence
bribes are also. In contrast, many of the results in the current paper stem from the fact
that contract terms (determining the penalty) vary, and consequently illicit payments do
also.

3
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nothing on litigation, or a fixed amount c. In contrast, much of the analysis
and results in the current paper relates to the size of payments that parties
make to the judge.3 Moreover, in focusing on judicial corruption in place of
general litigation (or “interference,” in the case of Legros and Newman) costs,
the current paper gives a distinct explanation for the source of the link between agency problems and the extent to which they can be solved with laws
and contracts. In particular, the focus on corruption allows the current paper
to address the difference between extortion and bribe-taking.
Finally, the paper is conceptually related to the literatures on influence
activities inside a firm (Milgrom 1988) and to collusion in principal-supervisoragent models (Tirole 1986). In particular, it shares the prediction that highpowered contracts engender collusion/influence-seeking. The current paper
adds to this general insight by showing the existence of a vicious circle in which
higher-powered contracts lead to more corruption, which undercuts incentives
and necessitates even higher-powered contracts;4 by analyzing a situation in
which two parties simultaneously engage in competing influence activities; by
comparing extortion and bribe-taking; and by considering appeals rights.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives some background examples
of judicial corruption. Section 3 presents the basic model of judicial corruption.
Section 4 explores several applications of the model. Section 5 examines the
comparative severity with which different forms of corrupt activity should be
punished. Section 6 analyzes appeals arrangements. Section 7 discusses some
robustness issues. Section 8 concludes.

2

Background

The key assumption of the paper is that individuals who enforce contracts are
sometimes corrupt. In many cases the contract enforcer is a judge. Although
judges occupy a position of unusual respect in many peoples’ imagination,5
and moreover corrupt behavior is always at least somewhat hidden, there is
no shortage of evidence of judicial corruption.
3

The finding that there is an upper bound on the incentives that a contract can provide
(see Proposition 2) is an example.
4
In contrast, in Milgrom’s model time spent on influence activities does not reduce incentives. Instead, influence activities are costly simply because they divert time from productive
uses.
5
Even in Tom Wolfe’s systematically misanthropic Bonfire of the Vanities, Judge Kovitsky is one of a tiny number of characters to be presented in a (more-or-less) sympathetic
light. For a more extended discussion of the portrayal of the legal system in the novel, see
Posner (1995, pages 481-489).

4
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Instances in which judicial corruption is actually detected provide one
source of evidence, albeit anecdotal in character. To give just a couple of
examples, within the U.S. (where courts are often assumed to be relatively
free of corruption) Judges Victor Barron and Gerald Garson were convicted
of corrupt behavior in Brooklyn civil courts, in 2002 and 2007 respectively.6
One could give many more examples along these lines. The case of Caperton
v Massey provides a more contentious example with much higher stakes: in
2004, while Massey was in the process of appealing a prior $50M judgement,
Massey’s CEO made a $3M contribution to the election campaign of Judge
Brent Benjamin, who subsequently ruled in Massey’s favor.
The various corrupt dealings of Vladimiro Montesinos in Peru provide
somewhat more systematic evidence. Montesinos was a powerful chief of
Peru’s secret police, and required his counterparties in corrupt deals to sign
“contracts.” Additionally, he videotaped many of the illicit negotiations (see,
for example, McMillan and Zoido 2004). Consequently, in this case one has
close to a comprehensive catalogue of individuals who entered corrupt deals
with Montesinos, and judges figure prominently.7
More systematic evidence is provided by surveys conducted in transition
economies by the World Bank. Hellman et al (2000) report that in the 22
countries surveyed, an average of 18% of firms interviewed stated that they
were significantly affected by the “purchase of criminal courts” and the “purchase of commercial courts.” In Azerbaijan, these figures were as high as 44%
for criminal courts and 40% for commercial courts. An even more negative
view of the court system emerges from a survey conducted by the Taiwanese
magazine, the CommonWealth, and cited by Mui (page 250, 1999). Only one
third of the 1,215 respondents stated that it was unnecessary “to offer a bribe
to the judge to win litigation”.
Finally, any reading of legal history makes clear that judicial corruption
is very much the historical norm.8 Perhaps in reaction to this, modern legal
systems include a number of features that serve to limit the power and discretion of the judge, such as appeal rights — analyzed in more detail in Section
6 below.
6

Both cases were widely reported in the media, and are unrelated to each other.
See Table 3 of McMillan and Zoido. One example of Montesinos’s activities which
attracted particular attention in the U.S. relates to a court case over the ownership of
Yanacocha gold mine.
8
See, e.g., Hoeflich (1984).
7

5
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3

Judicial Agency

The paper studies the impact of judicial agency on contracting in the context
of the following (extremely simple) moral hazard problem. A principal P
wants an agent A to take a good action (G) over a bad action (B). The
combined surplus of the two individuals when the good action is chosen is s,
while the agent prefers taking the bad action by an amount z. To focus the
analysis on how judicial agency affects contracting, I assume throughout that
the principal observes the agent’s action9 a ∈ {B, G}. Both the principal and
agent are assumed to be risk-neutral.
In this simple setting, the only function of a contract is to either reward
the agent when he takes the good action, and/or punish him when he takes
the bad action. So a contract stipulates a transfer tG to be made from the
principal to the agent when the agent takes the good action, and a transfer tB
to be made when the agent takes the bad action. When tG < 0 or tB < 0,
then the transfer is understood to be from the agent to the principal. Given
a contract (tG , tB ), let Z (tG , tB ) ≡ tG − tB denote the contractual incentives
provided to the agent to take the good action. As we will see, once one takes
into account judicial agency the actual incentives provided to the agent will
typically be less than the contractual incentives Z.
Whenever the contract stipulates that either the principal or agent make
a transfer to the other party, an enforcement authority is required to make
sure the transfer takes place. The paper typically refers to the enforcement
authority as the judge, although clearly multiple parts of the justice system
will be engaged in carrying out the judge’s decision.
To keep the analysis as transparent as possible, I assume moreover that the
judge observes the agent’s action a. It is of course important that the agent’s
action is not completely publicly observable, since in this case judicial agency
would be trivial to deter. Moreover, the assumption that the judge observes the
agent’s action can itself be relaxed without significantly changing the paper’s
main results — details are available from the author upon request.10
If the judge enforces the contract terms as intended, then the agent takes
the good action if the contractual incentives Z (tG , tB ) exceed the agent’s pri9

If the principal observed only a noisy signal of the agent’s action, the judicial agency
problem would be worsened since the difference between the most and least favorable outcomes mandated by the contract would be increased.
10
If the judge does not directly observe the agent’s action then the contract needs to be
designed so as to induce the principal and agent to truthfully report it. It can be shown
that this additional complication has relatively little effect on the amount of equilibrium
corruption.

6
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vate benefit from taking the bad action, z.
However, the judge may lack incentives to enforce the contract. For example, suppose that the agent has taken the good action. According to the
contract, the principal should pay tG to the agent. But if the principal pays
a bribe the judge might be tempted to wrongly rule in his favor and instead
impose the transfer tB < tG .11 Likewise, the judge might demand a payment
from the agent in order to rule correctly for him. Following Lindgren (1993)
and Ayres (1997), I will refer to the first case as judicial bribe-taking, and to
the second case as judicial extortion. That is, bribe-taking is when a party
pays for a better outcome than deserved; extortion is when a party pays to
avoid a worse outcome than is deserved.

3.1

Modelling corruption

Judicial corruption can be modelled in many ways. In this paper I follow an
approach popular in the rent-seeking literature and model the court’s decision
as the outcome of an all-pay auction,12 in which both the principal and agent
have the opportunity to make illicit payments to the judge with the aim of
influencing him. In an all-pay auction, the “seller” — here, the judge —
keeps all payments, and gives the “good” — here, the favorable ruling — to
the party who pays the most. In the context of judicial corruption, the “allpay” assumption captures the idea that, because the payments are illicit, the
judge is not contractually obliged to decide the case in favour of a party who
pays him, and is free to simply keep all payments. At the same time, the
all-pay framework assumes that the judge treats a party who makes a larger
payment more favorably, despite the lack of contractual obligation. This
favoritism may stem from the need for judges who accept illicit payments to
maintain some reputation for “honoring” these payments; from the threat of
retribution at the hands of disappointed payers; or may arise simply because
the judge is genuinely unsure how the case should be decided, and looks more
favorably on a party who makes a generous “gift.” Regardless of the exact
motive, it is hard to see how judicial corruption can occur at all unless, on
average, judges respond to illicit payments.13
11

If the parties contract at all they set tG > tB ; if instead they set tG ≤ tB , the agent
takes action a = B, which is the same action he takes absent any contract.
12
See, e.g., Baye et al (1993, 2005), and Siegel (2009).
13
While the all-pay framework effectively assumes that the judge has some ability to
commit, it stops short of assuming full-commitment. If instead the judge were able to fully
commit, he would (in terms of notation introduced below) extort Z − γ e from the party
in the right whenever αe + γ e < Z. Qualitatively, the paper’s main results would remain

7
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Importantly, I assume that the judge responds differently to payments from
the two parties, depending on the agent’s action a. Specifically, suppose the
agent took action a = G (respectively, a = B), and so the judge should rule
in his favor. In this case, and as formalized below, I assume that if the two
parties pay the judge a roughly similar amount, the judge will rule — correctly
— in favor of the agent (respectively, the principal). For the remainder of the
paper, I refer to a party as being in the right if he deserves to win the case,
and being in the wrong if he deserves to lose, e.g., the agent is in the right
after a = G and in the wrong after a = B. Thus the party in the right has
a “head start” in court over the party in the wrong. When courts are very
corrupt, both parties may make large illicit payments, and the value to the
agent of taking action G rather than B stems almost entirely from the value
of this head start; and is little affected by actual contractual incentives Z (see
Proposition 2).
Formally, denote any illicit payments made by the principal and agent
as xP ≥ 0 and xA ≥ 0 respectively. To capture the idea that payments
are illegal, I assume there is a fixed cost to each party of making a strictly
positive payment, and a fixed cost to the judge of accepting any strictly positive
payment. These fixed costs also imply that many contracting parties make
no illicit payment, even when dealing with a judge who is very corrupt. At the
same time, these fixed costs somewhat complicate the analysis by introducing
discontinuities in the all-pay auction: by way of contrast, even Siegel’s (2009)
otherwise general analysis of all-pay contests assumes continuity.14
Suppose first that the agent took action a = G, and so is the party in the
right. Consequently, any payment from the agent is the outcome of extortion,
in the sense discussed above. Let γ e be the agent’s cost of offering a strictly
positive payment, xA > 0, and αe be the judge’s cost of accepting the payment.
Likewise, any payment from the principal is an instance of judicial bribetaking. Let γ b be the principal’s cost of offering a strictly positive payment,
xP > 0, and αb be the judge’s cost of accepting the payment.
Clearly the judge only accepts payments xA ≥ αe and xP ≥ αb . Consequently, I assume without loss that the agent (principal) either makes no
payment, xA = 0 (xP = 0) or makes a payment xA ≥ αe (xP ≥ αb ), and the
payment is accepted. The acceptance costs αe and αb affect not only whether
a judge accepts a payment, but also how much these payments influence him
— other things equal, the more costly it is for a judge to accept an illicit payment, the less that payment is likely to sway him. If both parties make positive
unchanged.
14
In Section 7 I discuss an alternative specification of costs.

8
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payments the judge rules for the agent if and only if xA − αe ≥ xP − αb − α0 ,15
where α0 is the cost to the judge of ruling wrongly (he may find this morally
objectionable, and wrong decisions may hurt a judge’s career). If only the
principal makes a positive payment, the judge rules in his favor if and only if
xP − αb − α0 ≥ 0. Otherwise the judge rules correctly for the agent.
The principal and the agent have the same “skill” in making payments to
the judge, and so the costs associated with payments depend only on which
party is in the right. If the agent took action a = B he deserves to lose in
court, and the costs are reversed relative to the case a = G. Specifically, the
costs to the agent and judge associated with making and accepting a payment
are γ b and αb , since such payments now represent bribe-taking; and the costs
to the principal and judge associated with making and accepting a payment
are γ e and αe ,16 since such payments now represent extortion. The judge
bears an additional cost α0 if he rules for the agent. Consequently, if both
parties make positive payments the judge rules for the principal if and only if
xP − αe ≥ xA − αb − α0 .
Judges are heterogeneous, and differ in their corruption costs (α0, αb , αe ).
To simplify the exposition, let α0 +αb be drawn from a continuous distribution,
with E [α0 + αb − αe |α0 + αb ] continuous as a function of α0 + αb .17
The timing is as follows. First, the principal and agent observe their costs
γ b and γ e . Both parties observe both costs. Second, the contract is selected
to maximize the combined expected payoff of the two parties. Third, the
agent takes an action a ∈ {G, B}. Fourth, the contract is adjudicated in
court: the principal and agent learn the identity of the judge, along with his
corruption costs (α0, αb , αe ), and then simultaneously choose their payments
xP and xA .

3.2

Court outcomes

When corruption costs are zero (i.e., αe = γ e = αb = γ b = α0 = 0) the
equilibrium of the two-player all-pay auction is well-known.18 Both players
play mixed strategies with payments drawn from a uniform density over [0, Z],
15

Note that the tie is broken in favor of the party in the right.
The costs of making payments, γ e and γ b , potentially differ from each other because the
penalty incurred if an illicit payment is uncovered may differ according to whether the payer
is the party in the right or wrong, i.e., whether the payment is an instance of extortion or
bribe-taking. See Section 5 below.
17
These continuity assumptions are used only in subsection 3.4.
18
See, for example, Baye et al (1996).
16

9
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and the “rent” of Z is completely dissipated.19 Corruption costs complicate
the analysis, and modify the conclusion that rents are fully dissipated.
Let Pr (P ) and Pr (A) be the probabilities that the principal and agent
win in court. The principal’s expected utility from the court case is thus
−tG + Z Pr (P |a) − E [xP |a] − γ Pr (xP > 0|a), where γ = γ b , γ e if the agent
took action a = G, B, respectively. Note that whether the principal is in
the right or not affects his payoff through his probability of winning, through
his expected equilibrium payment xP , and through the cost of making an
illicit payment. Likewise, the agent’s expected utility from the court case is
tB + Z Pr (A|a) − E [xA |a] − γ Pr (xP > 0|a), where γ = γ e , γ b if the agent took
action a = G, B, respectively. Observe that both parties gain Z from success
in court. Define the payoff functions
VPG
VAG
VPB
VAB

=
=
=
=

Z Pr (P |G) − E [xP |G] − γ b Pr (xP > 0|G)
Z Pr (A|G) − E [xA |G] − γ e Pr (xA > 0|G)
Z Pr (P |B) − E [xP |B] − γ e Pr (xP > 0|B)
Z Pr (A|B) − E [xA |B] − γ b Pr (xA > 0|B) .

I analyze the equilibrium outcomes if the agent took action a = G; the case
in which he took action a = B follows symmetrically. Let XP and XA be
the equilibrium supports of strictly positive payments made by the principal
and agent to the judge. As already noted, one can assume without loss that
inf XA ≥ αe , inf XP ≥ αb , and the judge accepts all payments. Additionally,
inf XP ≥ αb + α0 , since otherwise the principal’s payment is too small to affect
the judge’s decision; and sup XA ≤ Z − γ e and sup XP ≤ Z − γ b , since the
equilibrium payments of both parties are bounded above by the amount at
stake in court, net of costs.
The following result summarizes several standard arguments for all-pay
auctions, suitably modified for the existence of costs α0 , αe , αb :
Lemma 1 (Standard all-pay auction results)
Suppose the agent took action a = G.
(A) There are no atoms in the agent’s strategy strictly above αe , and no atoms
in the principal’s strategy strictly above α0 + αb .
(B) Suppose XP and XA are non-empty. Then sup XP −αb −α0 = sup XA −αe ;
inf XP − αb − α0 = inf XA − αe = 0; and there are no holes in either XP or
19

That is, E [xA + xP ] = Z. Moreover, if corruption costs are zero, the principal and
agent’s abilities to influence outcomes are independent of the action a taken by the agent.
Consequently, the agent has no incentive to take the good action, regardless of the choice
of contractual incentives Z. Formally, see Proposition 2 below.

10
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XA .
(C) Suppose XP and XA are non-empty. Then the principal’s and agent’s
strategies both place a uniform density of Z1 over the interior of these sets.
As Proposition 1 below shows, the corruption costs αb , γ b and α0 all have
qualitatively similar effects on equilibrium outcomes, since all make it easier
for the party in the right to win. Likewise, the costs αe and γ e both make
it harder for the party in the right to win. In fact, these costs matter only
via their sums, i.e., Γb ≡ αb + γ b + α0 and Γe ≡ αe + γ e . I make the mild
assumption that these costs are lower for the party in the right than the party
in the wrong:
Assumption 1 Γb > Γe .20
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium court outcomes)
Suppose the agent took action a = G. An equilibrium of the payment game
exists, is unique, and has the following properties:
If corruption costs are high, i.e., Γb > Z, then neither party makes a payment;
the agent wins the case; VPG = 0; and VAG = Z.
If corruption costs are low, i.e., Z > Γb > Γe , then both parties make payments
with positive probability; VPG = 0; and VAG = Γb − Γe .
When corruption costs are low, and so both parties make payments, this
result coincides with existing results for all-pay contests — see, in particular,
Siegel (2009).21,22 The incremental contribution of Proposition 1 is to deal
with the effect of the fixed costs of making and receiving illicit payments,
namely γ e , αe , γ b , αb . When these costs are high, the parties abstain from
making illicit payments.
An increase in the costs associated with bribery (α0 , αb and γ b ) increases
the payoff of the party in the right (i.e., the agent, if a = G) because it makes it
harder for the party in the wrong to sway the judge. In equilibrium, the party
20

For completeness, Proposition A-1 in the appendix characterizes equilibrium payoffs
when Assumption 1 does not hold.
21
In detail, in Siegel’s terminology the agent’s “score” is sA = xA + αb + α0 , while
the principal’s score is xP + αe . The costs of attaining these scores are, respectively,
sA − (αb + α0 ) + γ e and sP − αe + γ b . Hence the “reaches” of the agent and principal,
respectively, are Z + (αb + α0 ) − γ e and Z + αe − γ b . By Siegel’s Theorem 1, the agent’s
payoff is then the value of the prize, Z, net of his cost of attaining a score equal to the
principal’s reach, i.e., (Z + αe − γ b ) − (αb + α0 ) + γ e = Z + Γe − Γb , which coincides with
the low-corruption case of Proposition 1.
22
Related, Assumption 1 simply states that the party in the wrong is — in Siegel’s terminology — the “marginal” player.
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in the right benefits both because he makes smaller payments to the judge, and
(even given these smaller payments) wins the case more often. Conversely,
an increase in the costs associated with extortion actually make the party in
the right worse off. It is now more expensive for him to compete with bribes
paid by the party in the wrong. In equilibrium, he ends up making larger
payments; incurring a larger cost (γ e ) to make these payments; and losing the
case more often.

3.3

Incentives and contract costs

The actual incentive that a contract Z provides to the agent to take action
a = G rather than a = B is simply the difference in the agent’s expected
payoff across these two actions. I denote the actual incentives by I (Z):
Proposition 2 (Contractual versus actual incentives)
The incentives provided by the contract are


Γb − Γe
I (Z) ≡ Z − ZE 1 −
|Γb < Z Pr (Γb < Z) .
Z
An increase in contractual incentives Z affects the incentives I (Z) provided
to the agent with an elasticity of less than unity: I (Z) /Z is decreasing in Z.
Moreover, I (Z) is bounded above by E [Γb ].
Proposition 2 quantifies the extent to which court corruption reduces the
incentives provided below Z. Moreover, increasing contractual incentives Z is
partially self-defeating: there is now more at stake in court, so illicit payments
are larger, and hence more judges behave corruptly. More formally, increases in
contractual incentives have a relatively small effect on actual incentives, in the
sense that the elasticity of I (Z) with respect to Z is small. Strikingly, this
feedback effect from higher contractual incentives to more corrupt behavior
means that even as contractual incentives are increased to arbitrarily high
levels, the incentives provided to the agent are bounded above.
Asides from the incentives provided by a contract, the contracting parties
also care about the cost of the contract, i.e., the resource dissipation they
anticipate from corruption costs and payments to the judge. Let C (Z) be the
total cost of a contract Z:
Proposition 3 (Contract costs)
For contracts such that I (Z) ≥ z, the cost of the contract is C (Z) = Z −I (Z),
and is increasing in Z.
12
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3.4

Equilibrium incentives and costs

A contract is only worth writing if it provides enough incentives for the agent to
take the good action, i.e., I (Z) ≥ z. From Proposition 3, the cost C (Z) is increasing in contractual incentives Z. Hence the contracting parties will always
choose Z minimally,23 subject to satisfying the incentive condition I (Z) ≥ z.
Define

min {Z : I (Z) ≥ z} if {Z : I (Z) ≥ z} 6= ∅
∗
Z (z) =
∞
otherwise
Thus when subject to the possibility of judicial corruption, the contracting
parties will choose the contract (tG , tB ) to satisfy tG −tB = Z ∗ (z). At this level
of incentives, the cost of writing the contract is C (Z ∗ (z)), the combination of
direct corruption costs and expected bribes that the contracting parties will
end up paying to the judge. In the case that Z ∗ (z) = ∞ (i.e., no level of
contractual incentives Z provides incentives z) let C (Z ∗ (z)) = ∞.
The function C (Z ∗ (z)) is the equilibrium cost of providing the agent with
incentives z. The next result shows that this cost increases quite steeply
in z. The reason is that as z increases, the contractual terms Z needed to
incentivize the agent rise more (Proposition 2). This, in turn, causes the costs
of contracting to rise (by Proposition 3) quickly:
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium cost of providing sufficient incentives)
The elasticity of the cost C (Z ∗ (z)) with respect to required incentives z exceeds
∗
unity, i.e., C(Zz (z)) is increasing in z.

3.5

Other changes in corruption costs

Corruption levels differ widely across legal jurisdictions. Formally, different
levels of corruption are represented by different distributions of corruption
costs. How does the overall level of corruptibility of judges affect contract
incentives and costs?
To formalize what it means for one pool of judges to be more corrupt than
another, it is useful to make the following assumption, which guarantees that
judicial populations can be totally ordered in terms of corruptibility:
Assumption 2 E [α0 + αb − αe |α0 + αb ] is weakly increasing in α0 + αb .
23

See Glaeser and Shliefer (2003) and Malik (1990) for related observations.
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A judge’s extortion costs αe may well be positively correlated with his
bribe-taking cost αb and his cost of ruling wrongly, α0 . Assumption 2, which
is used only in Proposition 5, simply says that as α0 and αb increase, any
corresponding increase in the conditional expectation of αe is (weakly) less
than the increase in α0 + αb .
Given Assumption 2, I define a pool of judges as being less corrupt than a
second pool if the corruption costs α0 + αb are higher in the first pool, in the
sense of first-order stochastic dominance:
Proposition 5 (Changes in judicial corruptibility)
Suppose the distribution of α0 +αb in one pool of judges first-order stochastically
dominates the distribution of α0 + αb in a second pool, and that Assumption 2
is satisfied for both pools. Then contractual incentives I (·) are lower for the
second pool, while both required incentives Z ∗ (z) and the cost of contracting
C (Z ∗ (z)) are higher for the second pool.

3.6

Alternate interpretation: expenditures on lawyers

Thus far I have interpreted the payments xA and xP as illicit payments to
judges. The judge decides for the agent after a = G provided that xP exceeds
xA by less than α0 + αb − αe , that is, the cost of deciding wrongly for the
principal combined with the difference (if any) of the cost of accepting illicit
payments from the two parties.
However, one can also interpret xA and xP as expenditures on lawyers,
where greater expenditures translate to a greater chance of winning the case.
In particular, consider the special case in which αe = αb = γ e = γ b = 0.
Under the alternative interpretation, the judge decides for the agent after
a = G provided that xP exceeds xA by less than α0, where α0 reflects the
agent’s natural advantage in the case. That is, the principal is only successful
in swaying the judge if he spends an amount α0 more on lawyers than does
the agent.24
With the exception of the discussion of punishing extortion versus bribery
(see Section 5) all of the paper’s analysis applies to this alternative interpretation.25
24

Moreover, one can interpret parameter values αb > 0 as indicating that expenditures
on lawyers by the party in the wrong are only effective if they exceed αb .
25
While many papers in the legal literature analyze legal disputes as contests, relatively
few papers consider the consequences for the incentives provided to the parties with regard
to the “primary activity.” See Sanchirico (2008) for both a discussion of this point, and a
prominent exception to it.
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4
4.1

Discussion
The costs of judicial agency

In contrast to some models of corruption, judicial corruption in the current
model leads unambiguously to worse social outcomes. Specifically, judicial
corruption is deleterious to welfare in the following two ways.
First, it leads to the abandonment of productive activity. That is, absent
judicial corruption all principal-agent pairs would contract to supply the agent
with incentives of z or more, leading to the realization of the surplus s. With
judicial corruption however, some principal-agent pairs will find that the private costs C (Z ∗ (z)) exceed the private benefits s, and will cease to contract.
The surplus s is thus lost.
Second, the costs borne by judges and litigating parties who behave corruptly are deadweight costs to society. Nothing is gained by other individuals
that offsets the moral discomfort judges or litigants may incur in accepting
bribes, or the disutility inflicted on corrupt individuals who are subsequently
punished. This is true even if one counts the corrupt payments to judges as
pure transfers.
Formally, let the joint distribution of contracting opportunities (s, z) be
given by F , and let 1 denote the indicator function. Let DW (Z) be the
expected deadweight social cost associated with a contract Z, i.e., the expected
value of all corruption costs incurred in equilibrium.26 Note that the parties’
cost of contracting, C (Z), differs from the deadweight cost, DW (Z), by the
26

The deadweight cost DW (Z) can be calculated explicitly as follows. In equilibrium,
the agent takes action G. If Γb > Z then no corruption occurs. Otherwise, if Γb < Z the
equilibrium outcomes are as described in the proof of Proposition 1. Specifically, the agent
makes a strictly positive payment to the judge with probability 1 − µA , where µA = ΓZb .
The principal makes a payment α0 + αb with probability η P = ΓZe , makes no payment with
probability µP = µA − η P , and makes a strictly positive payment other than α0 + αb with
probability 1−µP −η P = 1−µA . The judge wrongly rules for the principal with probability
1−µ
µA (1 − µP ) + (1 − µA ) 2 A . So the expected deadweight cost is


1 − µP − η P
µA (1 − µP ) + (1 − µA )
α0 + (1 − µA ) (αe + γ e ) + (1 − µP ) (αb + γ b )
2


1 − µA
= (1 − µP ) (µA α0 + αb + γ b ) + (1 − µA )
α0 + αe + γ e .
2
Hence


1
DW (Z) = E (1 − µP ) (Γb − (1 − µA ) α0 ) + (1 − µA )



−
µA
α0 + Γe |Γb < Z Pr (Γb < Z) .
2
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expected payments to judges net of the expected corruption cost incurred in
equilibrium by judges. Since judges voluntarily accept bribes, it follows that
C (Z) > DW (Z).
Using this notation, the total social cost of corruption is
Z
Z
∗
s1 (s < C (Z (z))) dF (s, z) + DW (Z ∗ (z)) 1 (s ≥ C (Z ∗ (z))) dF (s, z) ,
where the first term is the welfare loss associated with foregone surplus, and
the second term is the expected deadweight loss due to corrupt activity by
judges.
Consider a small increase in judicial corruptibility. By Proposition 5,
this increases the cost of contracting. Suppose that (s, z) is a contracting
opportunity that is eliminated by the increase in corruption. Before the
increase in corruption, the social surplus net of deadweight corruption costs
associated with (s, z) is s − DW (Z ∗ (z)) > 0. After the increase in corruption
the contracting opportunity is no longer pursued, representing a loss of social
surplus.
Indeed, for severe levels of judicial corruptibility almost all the social loss Γ
will be in the form of foregone surplus: since a principal-agent pair could only
effectively contract at the price of exposing themselves to a large corruption
cost, they will simply choose not to. Put another way, low levels of observed
corruption are compatible with a high level of corruptibility, for the simple
reason that when corruptibility is high no contracts are written and so no
judicial corruption is possible.
Finally, increases in corruptibility correspond to lower corruption cost parameters α0 etc. This generates a partially countervailing effect on the total
social cost of corruption, namely that agents find corruption less psychologically costly and/or are punished less often and less severely.

4.2

When are contracts written?

Economists have long appreciated that not all contracts are costless to write.27
The absence of contracts (or contract clauses) that would be desirable if they
could be written at zero cost is often termed “contractual incompleteness.”
The longest standing explanation is the existence of transaction costs.28
27

For example, contracting costs are central to Coase’s (1937) discussion of the boundary
of a firm.
28
See Williamson (1975). Other more recent explanations include those of Simon (1981),
Holmström and Milgrom (1991), Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Allen and Gale (1992),
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While the contracting costs C (Z ∗ (z)) of this paper are akin to a traditional
transaction cost, they also differ in a couple of important respects. First,
judicial agency locates the contracting costs with the enforcement of a contract,
as opposed to with the contract-writing stage. As such, judicial agency costs
are likely to be relevant even when a contract would be very beneficial, or used
many times.
Second, the assumption of judicial agency provides more structure on when
transaction costs are likely to be large. The key distinguishing prediction
of the judicial agency approach (as opposed to a simple transaction costs
approach) for contracting decisions is that contracting costs are increasing in
the incentives the contract supplies. That is, the most costly contracts to write
are those with high-powered incentives.
The next result summarizes the main predictions:
Proposition 6 (Implications for contracting)
A principal-agent pair with a project producing surplus s if incentives z are
provided to the agent will contract if and only if the surplus exceeds the cost
of contracting, i.e. s ≥ C (Z ∗ (z)). When the required incentives z are above
some level, z̄ say, no contract will be written,29 no matter how large the available surplus. Finally, an increase in the corruptibility of the judiciary will
lead to a reduction in contracting activity.
Proposition 6 is consistent with contractual incompleteness having important real consequences. Whenever the incentives z required to produce surplus
s are large, then contracts will not be written – even though the loss from the
absence of contracting is large.
Contractual incompleteness is often associated with contract contingencies
that are hard to describe. If undetected corruption is easier (i.e., corruption costs are lower) in such cases, as seems likely, Proposition 5 implies that
contracts are less likely to be written. Hence the analysis predicts that “indescribability” is associated with contract incompleteness.30
Spier (1992) and Segal (1999). Simon associates contractual incompleteness with bounded
rationality. Holmström and Milgrom and Bernheim and Whinston both suggest that contracting over some subset of actions will actually worsen the agency problems in other
dimensions of the action space. Allen and Gale and Spier suggest that contracts are incomplete because if a party suggested the inclusion of an additional contingency he would reveal
information he would rather keep hidden. Finally Segal argues that if in any state some
characteristics of the desired outcome are very similar to those of other “hold-up” outcomes
(a consequence of “complexity”), then ex post renegotiation will prevent an initial contract
from being useful.
29
Recall that Proposition 2 shows that incentives I (Z) are bounded above.
30
Moreover, this implication is not susceptible to Maskin and Tirole’s (1999) critique of
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5

Penalties for extortion and bribe-taking

As noted, judicial corruption can take two (closely related) forms. On the one
hand, a judge can threaten a party with the imposition of a worse outcome than
he deserves, unless a bribe is paid. Alternatively, a judge can accept a bribe
from a party to deliver better treatment than is deserved. Consistent both
with popular and academic usage, I have termed the first activity extortion
and the second bribe-taking.
Both opinion and practice are divided as to whether an individual who
pays a judge in response to extortion deserves the same punishment as one
found guilty of bribing a judge. For example, Lindgren (1993) notes that
“although the morality of giving in to a coercive extortion threat has been
debated for centuries, capitulating is often not illegal. Many people would
not consider it bribery for a citizen to pay off a public official who is forcing
the citizen to buy back what ought to be his for free.”31 The view that bribepaying in response to extortive threats is acceptable can of course be justified
on “fairness” grounds. However, this leniency has the potential cost of making
extortion easier and more prevalent.32
The model delivers a clear prediction on the comparative merits of punishing extortion and bribe-taking. To see this, note first that analytically
a punishment for extortion acts like an increase in αe and γ e (depending on
whether the judge or litigating party is punished). Likewise, a punishment for
bribe-taking acts like an increase in αb and γ b . Immediate from Propositions
2 and 3:
Proposition 7 (Punishing bribe-taking and extortion)
Punishing bribe-taking increases incentives I (Z) and reduces the contract cost
C (Z). Punishing extortion33 decreases incentives I (Z) and increases the
contract cost C (Z).
indescribability.
31
These issues are well-illustrated by recent debates over whether or not “facilitation”’
payments are covered by the US’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the OECD’s more recent Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions.
32
Thus Rose-Ackerman (1999, page 54) notes both that “[f]rom a pure deterrence point
of view, either side of the corrupt deal can be the focus of law enforcement efforts” and
“[f]rom the point of view of public acceptability, however, bribers who seek legal benefits
are likely to arouse public sympathies, not blame.”
33
I assume here that the punishment for extortion is such that Assumption 1 continues
to hold.
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The intuition behind Proposition 7 is as follows. On the one hand, punishing bribe-taking makes it harder for the party in the wrong to win a court
case, and so increases the payoff of the party in the right (see Proposition 1).
Since the agent is in the right after action G, and in the wrong after action
B, this increases incentives. Conversely, punishing extortion makes it more
expensive for the party in the right to win a court case, reducing the agent’s
incentives to take action G. I comment more on this result in the conclusion.
It is worth comparing Proposition 7 to the related findings of Polinsky and
Shavell (2001) and Khalil et al (forthcoming). In common with the current
paper, both papers observe that extortion undermines incentives by reducing
the agent’s gain from taking the socially desirable action. In common with
Proposition 7, Polinsky and Shavell (2001) show that punishing extortion may
reduce incentives. In the current paper this effect stems from the two-sided
nature of court case: punishing extortion makes it easier for the party in the
wrong to win the case by bribing the judge. In contrast, Polinsky and Shavell
model a contract enforcer dealing with a single agent. In their paper, the
problem with punishing extortion is that the contract enforcer switches to
“framing” the agent in order to receive a reward.
Khalil et al study a principal-supervisor-agent model in which they show
that equilibrium extortion does not occur. Extortion in their model takes
the form of the supervisor hiding positive evidence: unlike in the current
paper, he is unable to fabricate negative evidence. When extortion occurs,
the supervisor extracts a large enough payment so that the agent’s utility is
the same if there is positive evidence as if there is no evidence.34 But then the
principal can give the agent the same incentives with a contract that rewards
the agent equally for positive evidence and no evidence, and in which the
supervisor has no scope to extort the agent by hiding positive evidence. Note,
moreover, that Khalil et al rule out by assumption the possibility of directly
deterring and punishing extortion, so the question of optimal punishments for
extortion does not really arise in their paper.

6

Appeals

Many justice systems grant litigants a right of appeal under some conditions.
Such rights protect litigants from imperfections in the legal process, including
court corruption. How should appeal rights be granted if the objective is to
minimize court corruption?
34

See Appendix C in Khalil et al.
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I focus on the case of just one round of appeal. There are three distinct ways
in which appeal rights can be allocated. (I) Only the party being incentivized
by the contract (i.e., the agent) has the right to appeal. (II) Only the nonincentivized party (i.e., the principal) has the right of appeal. (III) Both
parties have the right to appeal.
Formally, the timing of events is as follows. First, parties litigate the case
as described in the main model. Following the court ruling, one or both parties
(depending on the appeals arrangement) has the right to appeal the case. In
this case, the parties return to court with a new judge. The corruption costs
of the first and second judge are uncorrelated.
Proposition 8 (Corruption-minimizing appeals)
Corruption costs are lowest under appeals arrangement (I).
The key to understanding Proposition 8 is to recall from Proposition 1 that
while judicial corruption affects court outcomes and the expected utility of the
party in the right, it has no effect on the expected utility of the party in the
wrong. In other words, the judge expropriates any benefit the party in wrong
might gain from affecting the court outcome.
Suppose first that only the agent is allowed to appeal, and consider the
equilibrium event in which the agent takes action a = G. On the one hand,
if the principal wins the initial trial the agent can appeal and the principal’s
expected utility from the second trial (net of bribe payments and corruption
costs) is simply −tG . But on the other hand, if the principal loses the initial
trial he cannot appeal and immediately pays tG to the agent. Consequently,
the principal has no stake in the outcome of the initial trial,35 and so does
not bribe the judge — but then the judge is unable to extort the agent either.
Hence equilibrium corruption is eliminated by agent-only appeal. In contrast,
corruption would still occur under agent-only appeal in the out-of-equilibrium
event that the agent takes action a = B, because in this case the principal has
something at stake in the initial trial.
Similar effects arise under principal-only appeal, but with the states reversed: corruption is now eliminated in the out-of-equilibrium event that the
agent takes action a = B, but still occurs in the equilibrium event that he
takes action a = G.
Finally, allowing both sides to appeal renders the decision of the first judge
irrelevant, and so is equivalent to the basic model with no appeals stage.
35

More generally, the conclusion of Proposition 8 follows provided that in the single-trial
case, court corruption affects the payoff of the party in the right more than the payoff of
the party in the wrong. Under this condition, if the party in the wrong is denied appeal
rights, he has relatively little at stake in the initial trial.
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Many criminal law systems protect defendants against double-jeopardy.
That is, while a criminal defendant is allowed to appeal a guilty verdict, the
prosecutor does not enjoy the symmetric right to appeal an innocent verdict.
This is exactly appeals arrangement (I), which Proposition 8 suggests is optimal from the perspective of minimizing corruption. Hence Proposition 8 both
provides a possible rationale for protection against double-jeopardy in criminal
law,36 and suggests that in justice systems afflicted by high corruption levels
it may be desirable to extend this protection to civil litigation.

7
7.1

Robustness
Settlement out of court (renegotiation)

Thus far I have assumed that, following the agent’s action a, the parties always
go to court and have their contract enforced. However, the parties have an
incentive to try to settle out of court, since doing so enables them to avoid
making payments to the judge and other corruption costs.
Under standard bargaining assumptions, the payoffs to the principal and
agent if they settle out of court are determined by their outside options, in this
case, what they would get by proceeding to court; their relative bargaining
strengths; and the surplus available from reaching agreement, i.e., settling.
The surplus available from avoiding going to court is C (Z) after both a = G
and a = B. Under the standard assumption that the bargaining strengths
of the two parties depend only on their identities, and not on the state (here,
the agent’s action a), it follows that the incentives provided to the agent are
unaffected by out-of-court settlement.
If the parties were able to successfully settle out of court all the time,
the cost on contracting produced by court corruption would vanish. In this
case, the only constraint imposed by court corruption is the upper bound on
attainable incentives identified in Proposition 2.
If instead settlement negotiations fail with some probability λ > 0, then
all of the prior results relating to the cost of contracting continue to hold —
although, of course, the cost is quantitatively lower.
36

Here, one needs to interpret the principal as a public-sector prosecutor. Although
public-sector prosecutors rarely derive direct monetary rewards from winning a court case,
they often benefit from enhanced career prospects (Boylan 2005). Likewise, prosecutors may
be able to influence judges in ways other than direct payments. The general conclusion of
Proposition 8 does not depend on the specific modelling of the way in which parties influence
the judge.
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7.2

Different specifications of the corruption process

This paper uses one specific, albeit standard, model of the corruption process, namely an all-pay auction. Clearly different specifications are possible.
However, the paper’s results are relatively insensitive to the specific model of
corruption used. In particular, an earlier draft of the paper instead assumed
a form of Bertrand competition in illicit payments, with the judge only accepting a payment from one of the two parties. The results were qualitatively
the same.

7.3

Alternate specifications of the cost of making illicit
payments

The analysis is based on one specific parameterization of the costs of making
illicit payments, namely, there is a fixed cost to making a strictly positive
payment. Other parameterizations are clearly possible. In particular, it is
possible that the cost of making an illicit payment grows in the size of the
payment. Here, I briefly discuss just such an alternative parameterization.
Formally, suppose that after the agent takes action a = G, the costs to a
judge of accepting payments xA and xP are ϕe (xA ) and ϕb (xP ) respectively,
while the costs to the agent and principal of making these payments are κe (xA )
and κb (xP ). The functions ϕe , ϕb , κe and κb are all continuous, and equal
0 when evaluated at 0. Analogous to before, the judge rules for the agent if
xA − ϕe (xA ) + α0 ≥ xP − ϕb (xP ).
I assume that larger payments are more valuable to the judge, i.e., both
x − ϕe (x) and x − ϕb (x) are increasing, and write ψe and ψb for the inverses of
these functions. Because the costs are all continuous, Siegel’s (2009) analysis
then applies directly. Assuming that the cost functions are such that the
party in the wrong — here, the principal — is the marginal agent in Siegel’s
sense, the principal’s
payoff is VPG = 0and the agent’s payoff is VAG = Z −

(κe ◦ ψe ) max (κb ◦ ψb )−1 (Z) − α0 , 0 .
An important property of the main model is that as contractual incentives Z increase, actual incentives are bounded above (Proposition 2). This
property holds for the alternate cost structure just described whenever VAG
converges to a constant as Z grows large, which in turn is the case when the
(κe ◦ψe )0 ((κb ◦ψb )−1 (Z)−α0 )
ratio (κ ◦ψ
converges to 1. Economically, this condition says
0
−1
(Z))
b
b ) ((κb ◦ψ b )
that when both parties are making large payments, the marginal cost of further increases in these payments is approximately the same for both parties —
regardless which party is in the right. For example, this condition is satisfied
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if the cost functions ϕe , ϕb , κe and κb are all linear, with ϕ0e = ϕ0b and κ0e = κ0b .

8

Conclusion

The paper studies the impact of judicial corruption on the incentives provided
by contracts, and, in turn, the response of contracting parties. Judicial corruption forces contracting parties to employ higher-powered contracts, which
in turn raise judges’ incentives to behave corruptly. Consequently, the cost
that corruption imposes on contracting parties (expected payments to judges)
is sharply increasing in the incentives that the contract seeks to provide. For
the same reason, the total incentives that can be contractually provided are
bounded above. The analysis suggests that in some circumstances parties
prefer to leave contracts or contract contingencies unwritten rather than subject themselves to litigating the contract in a corrupt court. Moreover, and as
discussed, one can straightforwardly reinterpret the model’s illicit payments
to the judge as lawyers’ fees.
The analysis implies that appeal rights should be granted only to the party
being incentivized, as is common in criminal law. Moreover, the analysis
implies that extortion should not be punished.
The idea that a contracting party should not be punished for making a
payment in response to an extortive threat squares well with many people’s
intuitions. However, the implication that the judge should also not be punished for extortion is more surprising. The main logic behind this result is
that punishing extortion — that is, illicit payments from the party in the right
to the judge — makes it easier for the party in the wrong to win the case. Of
course, there are circumstances in which it is simply too costly for the party
in the wrong to influence the judge (formally, if Γb > Z), and in such cases,
punishing extortion protects the party in the right. However, in these cases
it is not credible for the judge to decide the case incorrectly, and so he is unable to extort the party in the right — independent of how lightly or heavily
extortion is punished.
However, one may want to consider a perturbation of the model in which
the judge can extort the party in the right even when there is no chance of
the party in the wrong paying a bribe. (Of course, this perturbation raises
the question of how an extortive threat would be credible in this case.) In
such a model, punishing extortion would have some value, although the effect
identified by the current model would still be present: punishing extortion
disadvantages the party in the right relative to the party in the wrong. Which
effect dominates is then a quantitative matter.
23
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Finally, the paper has focused on the case in which judges act to maximize
their individual self-interest. As the analysis demonstrates, this makes dealing
with the court system costly for contracting parties, and in turn reduces the
amount of contracting. An interesting question is then whether judges would
wish to ex ante commit to limit the scope for court corruption, in order to
increase the amount of contracting and hence increase their total income from
corruption (though at the cost of less income per court case). An argument
along these lines would generate the possibility that court systems (via unions
or guilds of court employees) might be capable of partially policing themselves
to limit corruption.37

A

Appendix

For use in Section 6 on appeals, I establish slightly more general versions of
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 than stated in the main text. Specifically, I
consider a slight generalization of the payoff functions, in which the party in
the right gains δZ instead of Z, i.e.,
VPG (δ)
VAG (δ)
VPB (δ)
VAB (δ)

=
=
=
=

Z Pr (P |G) − E [xP |G] − γ b Pr (xP > 0|G)
δZ Pr (A|G) − E [xA |G] − γ e Pr (xA > 0|G)
δZ Pr (P |B) − E [xP |B] − γ e Pr (xP > 0|B)
Z Pr (A|B) − E [xA |B] − γ b Pr (xA > 0|B) .

I regularly omit the argument δ for the leading case of δ = 1. Note that the
statement in the main text that if a = G then sup XA ≤ Z − γ e is replaced
with sup XA ≤ δZ − γ e .
Lemma 1: As stated in the main text, with the exception that in part (C),
1
the principal’s strategy has uniform density δZ
.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Part (A): Standard arguments. In brief, suppose that the agent’s strategy
has an atom strictly above αe . Then the principal would never make a payment in the interval immediately below the atom. But then the agent can
deviate from the atom to a lower payment.
Part (B): Standard arguments. For the upper bonds, clearly if sup XA −αe 6=
sup XP − αb − α0 then one of the parties has a profitable deviation. For the
lower bounds, note first that if inf XA − αe > inf XP − αb − α0 then the
principal’s strategy must have no mass in (inf XP , inf XA − αe + αb + α0 ];
but then the agent can deviate downwards, giving a contradiction. By a
37

This argument is similar to those made in other contexts, see, e.g., Olson (1993).
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similar argument, inf XA − αe < inf XP − αb − α0 is also impossible. If
inf XP − αb − α0 > 0, then the principal can profitably deviate downwards.
The argument for the absence of holes is also similar.
Part (C): The principal’s payoff to paying xP is −xP − γ b
+ Z Pr (xA − αe ≤ xP − αb − α0 ). Differentiation with respect to xP implies
that the agent’s strategy must have a uniform density of Z1 over the interior
of XA . The result for the principal’s strategy follows symmetrically. QED
Proposition 1: Suppose the agent took action a = G. An equilibrium of the
payment game exists, is unique, and has the following properties:
If corruption costs are high, i.e., Γb > Z, then neither party makes a payment;
the agent wins the case; VPG = 0; and VAG = δZ.
If corruption costs are low, i.e., Z > Γb > Γe + (1 − δ) Z, then both parties make payments with positive probability; VPG (δ) = 0; and VAG (δ) =
− (1 − δ) Z + Γb − Γe .
Proof of Proposition 1:
Case: Γb > Z, i.e., α0 + αb + γ b > Z
The principal does not make a payment here, since only a payment of at
least α0 + αb can lead to him winning, and this exceeds the amount at stake Z
net of the cost of paying the bribe, γ b . So the agent does not make a payment
either, and wins.
Case: Z > Γb > Γe + (1 − δ) Z, i.e., Z > α0 + αb + γ b > αe + γ e + (1 − δ) Z
Let µA and η A be the masses at payments 0 and αe in the agent’s strategy,
and µP and η P be the masses at 0 and α0 +αb in the principal’s strategy. Note
that since sup XA − inf XA < Z, it follows from Lemma 1 that µA + η A > 0
and µP + ηP > 0. Write x̄ = sup XA , so that sup XP = x̄ + αb − αe + α0.
There is no equilibrium in which both XA and XP have zero mass, since
then paying xP = α0 + αb would be a strictly profitable deviation for the
principal. There is no equilibrium in which XA has zero mass and XP has
positive mass, since in such an equilibrium XP = {α0 + αb }, but then paying
xA = αe would be a strictly profitable deviation for the agent. There is no
equilibrium in which XP has zero mass and XA has positive mass, since in
such an equilibrium XA = {αe }, but then paying xP = α0 + αb + ε would be a
strictly profitable deviation for the principal for any ε > 0 sufficiently small.
Suppose that µP = 0, i.e., the principal always makes a strictly positive
payment. So η P > 0, and hence η A = 0 (since otherwise the principal has
a profitable deviation away from α0 + αb ). So µA > 0, and when the agent
does not make a payment he always loses. This implies x̄ = δZ − γ e . But
then the principal’s payoff approaches Z − (δZ − γ e + αb − αe + α0) − γ b as
xP → sup XP = x̄. By supposition this is strictly negative, implying that the
principal would do strictly better making a zero payment.
25
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Hence µP > 0, i.e., the principal sometimes makes no payment. Since the
principal always loses if he makes no payment, his payoff from all strategies
in his equilibrium support must be 0. So x̄ + αb − αe + α0 + γ b = Z, i.e.,
x̄ = Z − α0 − (αb + γ b ) + αe . So the agent’s payoff from all strategies in his
support must be δZ − x̄ − γ e = − (1 − δ) Z + α0 + (αb + γ b ) − (αe + γ e ).
Finally, I confirm that an equilibrium actually exists, i.e., that there exist
e
e
µA , η A , µP and η P such that x̄−α
= 1− µA − η A , x̄−α
= 1− µP − η P (the total
Z
δZ
probability mass on each player’s strategy is 1), and δZµP ≤ δZ − x̄ − γ e , with
equality if µA > 0 (the lefthand side is agent’s payoff from making no payment,
the righthand side is his payoff from the payment sup XA ). The last of these
e
conditions implies 1 − µP ≥ x̄+γ
, and so η P > 0. By prior arguments it
δZ
+γ e
follows that η A = 0 and µA > 0. So ηP = αeδZ
, µP = α0 +αb +γ b−(αδZe +γ e )−(1−δ)Z
and µA = α0 +αZb +γ b . It is straightforward to check that all three probabilities
lie in (0, 1). QED
The main text refers to the following result:
Proposition A-1 Suppose the agent took action a = G. An equilibrium of
the payment game exists, is unique, and has the following properties:
If Z > Γb and Γe + (1 − δ) Z > Γb and Γe > δZ then only the principal makes
a payment, and he wins the case; VP = Z − (α0 + αb ); and VA = 0.
If Z > Γb and Γe + (1 − δ) Z > Γb and δZ > Γe then both parties make
payments with positive probability; VP = (1 − δ) Z + Γe − Γb ; and VA = 0. If
δ ≤ 1 the agent wins with a strictly lower probability than the principal.
Proof of Proposition A-1:
Case: Z > Γb and Γe + (1 − δ) Z > Γb and Γe > δZ, i.e., Z > α0 + αb + γ b
and αe + γ e + (1 − δ) Z > α0 + αb + γ b and αe + γ e > δZ.
The agent makes no payment here, since the minimum payment the judge
accepts, αe , combined with the agent’s cost, γ e , exceeds the amount δZ at
stake for the agent. Given the agent makes no payment, the principal pays
α0 + αb and wins the case.
Case: Z > Γb and Γe + (1 − δ) Z > Γb and δZ > Γe , i.e., Z > α0 + αb + γ b
and αe + γ e + (1 − δ) Z > α0 + αb + γ b and δZ > αe + γ e .
As in the case Z > α0 +αb +γ b > αe +γ e +(1 − δ) Z analyzed in Proposition
1, both XA and XP have strictly positive mass. As in the proof of Proposition
1, let µA and η A be the masses at payments 0 and αe in the agent’s strategy,
and µP and η P be the masses at 0 and α0 +αb in the principal’s strategy. Note
that since sup XA − inf XA < Z, it follows from Lemma 1 that µA + η A > 0
and µP + ηP > 0. Write x̄ = sup XA , so that sup XP = x̄ + αb − αe + α0.
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Suppose that µP > 0, i.e., the principal sometimes makes no payment.
Equating the principal’s payoff from his maximum payment and and no payment implies x̄ = Z − α0 − αb − γ b + αe . But then the agent’s payoff from
paying xA = x̄ is δZ − Z + α0 + αb + γ b − αe − γ e < 0, and so he would strictly
gain from deviating and making no payment.
Consequently, µP = 0, i.e., the principal always makes a payment, and
hence ηP > 0 and η A = 0, and so µA > 0. The agent always loses if he makes
no payment, and so equating his payoffs from no payment and the maximal
payment, x̄ = δZ − γ e . So the agent’s payoff is 0, and the principal’s payoff
is Z − (x̄ + αb − αe + α0 ) − γ b = (1 − δ) Z + γ e + αe − α0 − (αb + γ b ) > 0.
Finally, I confirm that an equilibrium actually exists. In order for the
e
probability mass of both parties strategies to equal 1, 1 − η P = x̄−α
and 1 −
δZ
αe +γ e
αe +γ e
x̄−αe
µA = Z , and hence µA = 1−δ + Z and η P = δZ . It is straightforward
to check that both µA and η P lie in (0, 1). The principal has no profitable
deviation, since his payoff from any payment in his equilibrium strategy is
strictly positive (see above), while his payoff from making no payment is zero.

Note that the agent’s probability of winning is (1 − µA ) η P + 12 (1 − η P ) =
1
(1 − µA ) (1 + η P ). Since µA = 1 − δ + δη P , this expression rewrites to
2
δ
(1 − η 2P ). QED
2
 G
Proof of Proposition 2: From Proposition
1,
E
VA = E [Γb − Γe |Γb < Z]
 B
× Pr (Γb < Z) +Z Pr(Γb > Z) and
 B E VA = 0. The expression for I (Z) folG
lows from I (Z) = E VA − E VA .
For the elasticity implication, let α̃ = α0 + αb , and write H for its distribution function. So

Z Z−γ b 
I (Z)
α̃ + γ b − (αe + γ e )
= 1−
E 1−
|α̃ dH (α̃)
Z
Z
and so for any Z1 and Z2 > Z1 ,

Z Z2 −γ b 
I (Z2 ) I (Z1 )
α̃ + γ b − (αe + γ e )
−
=
E
− 1|α̃ dH (α̃)
Z2
Z1
Z2

Z Z1 −γ b 
α̃ + γ b − (αe + γ e )
−
E
− 1|α̃ dH (α̃)
Z1

Z Z2 −γ b 
α̃ + γ b − (αe + γ e )
=
E
− 1|α̃ dH (α̃)
Z2
Z1 −γ b

 Z Z1 −γ b
1
1
+
−
E [α̃ + γ b − (αe + γ e ) |α̃] dH (α̃) .
Z2 Z1
The first term is negative because if α̃ ≤ Z2 −γ b then α̃+γ b −(αe + γ e )−Z2 ≤ 0.
The second term is negative because Z12 − Z11 < 0 and α̃ + γ b − (αe + γ e ) is
27
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2)
1)
positive by Assumption 1. Hence I(Z
< I(Z
, establishing that I (Z) /Z is
Z2
Z1
decreasing in Z.
Finally, for the upper bound on I (Z), observe that

I (Z) = E [Z|Γb > Z] Pr (Γb > Z) + E [Γb − Γe |Γb < Z] Pr (Γb < Z)
≤ E [Γb ] − E [Γe |Γb < Z] Pr (Γb < Z) .
QED
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that absent corruption costs and payments
to the judge, VPa + VAa = Z, where a is the agent’s action. So the total
cost of corruption costs and payments to the judge is Z − E [VPa] − E [VAa ],
where the expectation
  is over
 possible realizations of corruption costs. Note
that I (Z) = E VAG − E VAB . Because equilibrium
depend only on
 G
 payoffs

B
whether
 Ga partyis Bin the right or wrong, E VA = E VP . From Proposition
1, E VP = E VA = 0 under Assumption 1. Hence for both a = G, B, the
cost is simply Z − I (Z).
For the second part, consider any pair of contracts
Z

1 and Z2 > Z1 . From

I(Z1 )
I(Z1 )
1)
Proposition 2, C (Z2 ) > Z2 − Z2 Z1 = Z2 1 − Z1
≥ Z1 1 − I(Z
=
Z1
C (Z1 ). QED
Proof of Proposition 4: The incentive function I is continuous, so {Z : I (Z) ≥ z}
has a minimum value, and hence I (Z ∗ (z)) = z. So
C (Z ∗ (z))
Z ∗ (z) − I (Z ∗ (z))
=
z
I (Z ∗ (z))
which is increasing in z since Z ∗ is increasing in z, and I (Z) /Z is decreasing
in Z by Proposition 2. QED
Proof of Proposition 5: Let α̃ = α0 + αb , and write
R H for its distribution
function. Then I (Z) can be written in the form I = u (α̃) dH (α̃), where α
is increasing and continuous except for at α̃ = Z − γ b . An easy adaptation of
standard arguments implies that if theRdistribution H first-order
stochastically
R
˜ (α̃). The
dominates the distribution H̃, then u (α̃) dH (α̃) > u (α̃) dH
result follows. QED
Proof of Proposition 8: Appeals arrangement (III) renders the decision of
the first judge irrelevant. Consequently, appeals arrangement (III) is equivalent to the basic model with no appeals stage.
Next, consider appeals arrangement (I). If the agent takes action a = G,
and the first judge rules for the agent, since the principal cannot appeal the
payoffs for the principal and the agent are simply −tG and tG = tB + Z
(ignoring any bribes and corruption costs, which at this point are sunk). If
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instead the first judge rules for the principal, the agent
 G will appeal and
 the

payoffs for
the
principal
and
the
agent
are
−t
+
E
V
and
t
+
E
VAG .
G
B
P
 G
Since E VP = 0 by Proposition 1, the principal’s payoff is independent of
the first judge’s decision. Consequently, the principal makes no payment
to the first judge, and since the agent deserves to win the case he does so
with probability 1. Because the agent takes action a = G in equilibrium, no
corruption occurs.
Finally, consider appeals arrangement (II). If the agent takes action a = G,
and the first judge rules for the agent, the principal
 G  will appeal and
 the payoffs
G
for the principal and the agent are −tG + E VP and tB + E VA . If instead
the first judge rules for the principal, the agent cannot appeal and the payoffs
for the principal and the agent are simply −tB = −tG + Z and tB . Since
E VPG = 0 by Proposition 1, the principal’sgain from winning the initial
trial is Z, while the agent’s is δZ, where δ = E VAG /Z < 1. The equilibrium
level of corruption costs is strictly positive here. QED
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